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Abstract 
This model is based on the Steven Klepper(1996)'s contribution to the Product Life Cycle(PLC) theory. We 
construct the specific functions of the original  model,  further design a mechanism for the competition and simulate 
to coincide with the past regularities about PLC. The model also aims  at revealing effect of the parameters to the 
industry evolution process .  It confirms the original model, and exposes the entry, exit, innovation, competitive 
behaviors in the industry .  This model has a generous structure with discrete periods that can be applied to specific  
industry. It also can be used to analyze and forecast  the  competition pattern in the energy industry. 
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1. Introduction 
When an industry is born, there are lots of entry and new product innovations, and then the rate of 
product innovation slow down, firms pay more attention to the process innovations and  the entry rate 
also declines, the market  stabilize finally. Steven Klepper developed a model and use it  to analyze this 
whole process in the industry. Our paper constructed a model that is based on the Steven Klepper(1996). 
The Steven Klepper's paper highlighted two types of innovation, the product innovation and process 
innovation. It predicts that in the product life cycle, firms  devote more to process innovation than product 
innovation. The model in his paper is adopted to explain the product life cycle, it had generous form and 
author proved it theoretically. Although it reveals the PLC(Product Life Cycle) process, all of functions in 
its model don't have specific forms. Thus, we can't check how the model works. Further, the entry and 
exit patterns of firms in the model omitted, the evolution process is black box to us. 
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      We first construct the original model with specific functions  and then design a discrete mechanism for 
the competition pattern. The mechanism is: sequential entry pattern and two types of exit pattern-exit by 
internal pressure and exit by external pressure. The entry behavior follows the sequential pattern, the 
largest endowment owner first enter and compete with the incumbents, when the  market endowment 
requirement is smaller than the first entrant, then the entrant can survive in the market. Only after the first 
entrant entered into the market, the second largest endowment owner outside the market is allowed enter 
into the market, the same process goes on until the market endowment requirement is larger than the 
entrant's endowment . There are two  types of exit  for the incumbents. One comes from the internal 
competition pressure between incumbents, here we assume that before the entry of potential entrants, the 
incumbents compete with each other, and thus it is possible that some firms have to leave, and so leave 
space for the potential entrants. The other type of exit  comes from external compete pressure by potential  
entrants, because when entrants enter into the market, some incumbents are kicked out. 
2. Original studies and our work 
2.1. Empirical studies on PLC  
Klepper's model successfully explained the six empirical regularities about PLC. First two patterns 
concern about the time path of  entry  and exit  in  the industry, which are summarized under the studies of 
Michael Gort and Klepper(1982), Klepper and  Elizabeth  Graddy(1990), Utterback and Fernando 
F.suarez(1993), Klepper and simons(1993). The third regularity consider the market shares of leading 
firms of industry over time which under the studies of Edwin Mansfield(1962) and Burton H.Klein(1977). 
The other three regularities concern about the technological change which  based on lots of case studies 
and two samples of innovations in United States by Utterback and Abernathy(1975) and the United  
Kingdom by C.De Bresson and J.Townsend(1981). 
x Although at the begging of the industry, the number of entrants may rise over time, eventually it  
   becomes small. 
x The number of total firms(incumbents  and entrants) have the similar tendency like the number of  
entrants, rise at the begging of the industry and finally declines steadily. 
x Eventually the rate of change of market  shares of leading firms  declines, and leadership of the industry  
stabilize. 
x The number o f product innovation rise at the begging of the industry and then decline over time. Firms 
devote more to process innovation than product process. Recent entrants takes a large number of  
     product innovation when the number of total firms in  the industry grows. 
2.2. Original model and our construction 
We strictly follow the assumptions and equilibrium conditions in the Kleppers’ model, and construct 
the corresponding functions and parameters. Because the competition behaviors in the o rig inal model are 
omitted, we construct the compete mechanism in our model. 
Table 1. The original model and our settings of functions and parameters   
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 Functions Original model Our settings of 
functions 
Our settings of 
parameters 
Market demand function Qt = f(pt)  
Qt is continuous and down slopping 
Qt = D – EPt D = 650; E  =1 
Product innovation g(rdit)  
g’(rdit)>0 and g’’(rdit)<0 for all rdit>=0 
g(rdit) = Jrdit – Hrdit2 J  = 2;  H = 1 
Process innovation l(rcit) 
l’(rcit)>0 and l’’(rcit)<0 for all rcit>=0 
l(rcit) asymptotically approaches to an 
upper bound 
l(rcit) = ] – K(rcit)-1/2 ] = C; K = 2 
Market adjustment cost m('qit) 
m’(0)=0, m’('qit)>0 for all 'qit>0 
m’’('qit)>=0 for all 'qit>=0 
m('qit) = -'qit2 - = 1 
One period monopoly profit for 
product innovation 
G G = a a=1 
Monitor cost F  
F > si + g(rdit)G – rdit 
F =  b b=1000.25 
(C: fixed cost per product; i: the ith firm; t: period t ; si: endowment of firm i) 
Table 2. The economic explanation of parameters 
Parameters Economic explanation 
D Maximal product demand in the market 
E  Consumer's sensitivity to the price change 
J Marginal revenue for input in the product innovation 
H Decreasing rate of marginal revenue 
] Maximal amount that the fixed cost can be cut off 
K Decreasing rate of marginal revenue for input in the process innovation 
- Increasing rate of market adjustment cost 
Table 3  The market equilibrium condition 
Equilibrium conditions Equations 
Market demand condition Qt = f(pt)                                                                                                                            (1) 
Expected profit function for  
firm i in period t  
E(3it) = [si + g(rdit)]G – rdit  
+ [Qit-1(Qt-1/Qt)+'qit]u[pt – C + l(rcit)] – rcit – m('qit) – F                                   (2) 
1st  order condition of (2) on rdit g’(rdit*)G = 1                                                                                                                      (3) 
1st order condition of (2) on rcit [Qit-1(Qt-1/Qt) + 'qit] l’(rcit*) = 1                                                                                         (4) 
1st order condition of (2) on 'qit m’('qit*) = pt – C + l(rcit*)                                                                                                 (5)  
Market clear condition Qt = ¦it {Qit-1(Qt/Qt-1) + 'qit }                                                                                           (6) 
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(Qit-1:  output of firm i in period t  –1) 
2.3. Additional assumptions and competitive mechanism 
Uniform distribution of endowment([10,20,30,40,50,...,1000]) of potential entrants, 100 potential 
entrants per period. Sequential entry pattern: largest endowment owner first in, s mallest endowment 
owner first out. Two steps of competit ion in  each period: internal competit ion period and externa l 
competition period. 
Except the first period, at the begging of each period, we let the incumbents compete with each other 
first and push the incumbents whose endowment are not big enough to stay in the market  leave out, Or it 
can be exp lained by the other way: some incumbents in the market forecast that they don't have enough 
endowment to compete with other incumbents, they gain the profits in limited  periods and then choose to 
leave finally. When the internal competition finish, the external competition period begins, the potential 
entrants try to enter into the market. 
3. Simulation result and discussion 
     We use the software 1ST OPT as the chief tool to solve the nonlinear equations and simulate the 
model. Four periods simulation results list in table 4. 
Table 4  Simulation result of the Industry's revolution process 
 1st  period 2nd period 3rd period 4th period 
Total output 612.1448 636.8545 639.7326 641.3113 
Market Price 37.8553 13.1455 10.2674 8.6887 
Total number of firms 33 28 24 23 
Total number of entrants 33 4 2 2 
Total number of leavers N/A 9 6 3 
Entry rate 33.33%
 
4% 2% 2%
 
Minimal endowment to enter 662.9102 967.0324 982.2229 988.7185 
Market share of a leading firm 3.03%
 
4.01% 4.76% 5.39% 
Process innovation of 1st  period firms 7.0075
 
8.6706 9.7535 10.6127
 
Process innovation of 2nd  period firms N/A
 
3.3104 4.8650 5.9990 
Process innovation of 3rd   period firms N/A
 
N/A 2.662 4.1299
 
Process innovation of 4th   period firms N/A N/A N/A 2.3912 
 
The total number of entrants and firms eventually becomes small,  the result is coincide with the first 
two regularities. The market share of leading firms keep rising in the evolution process. While, the change 
rate of market share of leading firm decrease from 0.98% to 0.63%,  the third regularity fulfils.  The last 
three regularities concern about the product innovation and process innovation over the industry evolution, 
we keep product innovation constant and equal to 0.5, it  is clear that the process innovation keep  
increasing, this is what the last regularities indicate. 
We further estimate the parameters’ effect on the industry evolution, and find that large F and E cause 
to low entry rate in the first period of industry evolution. Simulation results list in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 1: Change of entry rate for different F                                   Fig. 2: Change of entry rate for different beta  
4. Conclusion 
We successfully set up the specific forms of functions and parameters in the orig inal model and 
construct a competitive mechanis m in the industry. The simulation result of the discrete model are 
coincide with the regularit ies in PLC, and some of the parameters ’ effect to the industry evolution also be 
simulated, Other parameter's effect to the industry will be studied in the future. The model can  analyze 
the industry’s evolution process through modification on the parameters.  
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